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CONCLUSION
The entire question of immunity may be relegated to a position of no
significance if upon rehearing the court decides to withdraw or change
its prior decision. The purpose of this paper is solely to point up the over-
whelming opinion of scholars and the trend of the states-to do away with
the old theory. If the reader's curiosity is kindled, a reading of the Kane-
land case will lead him to innumerable authorities whose discussion of the
problem is too copious and lengthy for this paper.
MOVIE CENSORSHIP STANDARDS UNDER
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
With the advent of a multitude of moving pictures with prurient
overtones heralded by a spicy variety of come-hither advertising, there
is much concern as to what type of censorship is acceptable to the Supreme
Court of the United States. Quite unlike the poem by Stoddard King,
the movies do not arrive equipped with an asterisk.'
To the present day the Supreme Court has struck down such standards
as "best interests," "immoral," "tend to corrupt morals," "harmful," and
"alluringly portrays adultery as proper behavior." The problem of censor-
ship then is twofold. First, a standard acceptable to the United States
Supreme Court must be determined and second, an attempt must be made
to define the extent of allowable censorship, if any exists.
The first case to be considered in a review of censorship case law is
Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio,2 decided in 1915 wherein the Supreme Court
of the United States for the first time ruled on movie censorship. This
decision was'to remain the law of the land until 1952. The statute involved
in this case stated: "Only such films as are in the judgment and discretion
of the board of censors of a moral, educational or amusing and harmless
character shall be passed and approved by such board."3' The most impor-
tant contention of the plaintiffs so far as this discussion is concerned was
that the censorship violated the constitutional guarantees of Freedom of
Speech in both the United States and Ohio Constitutions. The Court in
upholding the statute under the Ohio Constitution, said:
1 "A writer owned an Asterisk, and kept it in his den,
Where he wrote tales (which had large sales) Of Frail and erring men,
And always, when he reached the point where carping censors lurk,
He called upon the Asterisk to do his dirty work."
"The Writer and the Asterisk," The Desk Drawer Anthology, compiled by Alice
Roosevelt Longworth and Theodore Roosevelt, Doubleday, Doran & Co., pp. 416
(1931).
2'236 U.S. 230 (1915).
3 Ibid., at 240.
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[Ilt cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures is a
business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spec-
tacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio Constitu-
tion, we think, as a part of the press of the country or as organs of public
opinion.4
In this instance the Court did not rule on the statute's constitutionality
under the U.S. Constitution, but concluded that since a movie had such
a great capacity for evil due to its method of communication and popular
appeal that the censorship thereof is not beyond the power of government.
From the time of the Mutual decision in 1915 until Burstyn v. Wilson
in 1952 only once was there any indication that movies were included
within the guaranties of the First Amendment. By way of dictum in
United States v. Paramount Pictures6 the Supreme Court stated: "We
have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are in-
cluded in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment. '7
BURSTYN V. WILSON-THE TURNING POINT
In 1952, in the Burstyn case, the Supreme Court, for the first time,
brought movies within the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments at least to the extent that they could not be censored as "sacrilegi-
ous." The movie involved was entitled "The Miracle" and was denied
an exhibition permit by the New York Board of Regents on the ground
that it was "sacrilegious" within the meaning of the New York movie
censorship statute.8
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the New York Court
of Appeals emphasizing that "[tihe state has no legitimate interest in
protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them.. ."0 and
concluded by "hold [ing] only that under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment a state may not ban a film on the basis of a censor's conclusion that
it is "sacrilegious." 10
At that time, the turning point in movie censorship had been reached
with the inclusion of movies within the Freedom of Press and the specific
overruling of the Mutual case "to the extent that [it] is out of harmony
4 Ibid, at 244.
5 343 US. 495 (1952).
6 334 US. 131 (1948).
7 lbid, at 166.
8 A motion picture shall not be licensed if it is "obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman,
sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals
or incite to crime." New York Education Law (McKinney, 1953) c. 16, sec. 122.
9 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 US. 495, 505 (1952).
10 Ibid, at 506.
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with the views here set forth."" The Court, thus, had abandoned the
half-century old ruling that movies were merely a business, pure and
simple, divorced from the normal channels of public communication.
VAGUENESS-ANATHEMA OF MOVIE CENSORSHIP
A few months. subsequent to the Burstyn case an appeal from a con-
viction under an ordinance of the City of Marshall, Texas, for the exhi-
bition of a motion picture previously denied a license, came before the
Court. In this case, Gelling v. Texas,12 the appellant in spite of a ruling
by a local board of censors that the picture is "of such character as to
be prejudicial to the best interests of the people of said City,"'8 exhibited
the picture and was convicted of a misdemeanor.
The Court reversed the conviction in a memorandum decision citing
the Burstyn case and the case of Winters v. New York. 14 It will be
remembered that the Burstyn case reversed the New York Court of Ap-
peals on the sole ground that censorship using only the criteria of "sacri-
legious" was odious to the First and Fourteenth Amendments; from this it
may be concluded that Burstyn has been expanded to reject the criteria
used in the Gelling case. The Winters case concerned prosecution under
a statute prohibiting the distribution of magazines featuring criminal deeds,
bloodshed and lust, and resulted in the conviction of the defendant book-
seller. The Court, in Winters, reversed the conviction of the bookseller,
stating, "where a statute is so vague as to make criminal an innocent act,
a conviction under it cannot be sustained."' 15
In summarizing the Gelling case, the conclusion is inescapable that
when "the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea," 16 censorship will not
be allowed where the standard used is vague and indefinite.
Two cases arose in 1953, further extending the area within which movies
were constitutionally protected. Both were decided by the Supreme Court
in Superior Films v. Dept. of Education,17 a per curiam, memorandum
decision based only on the Burstyn case.
In the Ohio case, the motion picture "M" was denied a permit merely,
"on account of [its] being harmful,""' and the movie "Native Son" was
denied a permit since it was "harmful: because [it] contributes to racial
misunderstanding, presenting situations undesirable to the mutual interests
of both races; against public interest in undermining confidence that justice
11 Ibid., at 502.
12 343 U.S. 960 (1952). 15 Ibid., at 520.
13 Ibid., at 960. 16 343 U.S. 495, 504 (1952).
14 333 U.S. 507 (1948). 17 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
Is Superior Films v. Dept. of Education, 159 Ohio St. 315, 316, 112 NE.2d 311, 312
(1953).
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can be carried out; presents racial frictions at a time when all groups
should be united against everything that is subversive.""'
In the New York case the motion picture "La Ronde" was denied a
license on a ruling that it was "immoral" and "would tend to corrupt
morals."' 20 From the reversal, another memorandum decision, this time with
Burstyn as the sole authority, it must be assumed, that the standards ap-
plied did not have the benefit of "a clearly drawn statute designed and
applied to prevent the showing of obscene films."'21 In this further exten-
sion of Burstyn, it seems clear that the criteria used must be definite and
not a vague potpourri of inexact terminology.
In 1955, the Kansas State Censor Board had disallowed the showing
of the motion picture "The Moon is Blue" on a finding that the film was
"obscene, indecent and immoral, and such as tends to debase or corrupt
morals. ' 22 The Supreme Court, in Hoimby Productions v. Vaughn,23
reversed the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court upholding the cen-
sorship ruling. The ruling, continuing the practice of memorandum deci-
sions, was based only on the Burstyn and Superior cases. In view of this,
and realizing that the Superior case was decided on the basis of the Burstyn
case, we must conclude that the Burstyn decision has again been expanded
and that the constitutional fortress cannot be beseiged by an inexact
standard.
OBSCENITY ENTERS THE PICTURE
The City of Chicago, in 1957, censored the movie "Game of Love"
under Chicago's censorship ordinance, 24 expressly stating that the film was
"immoral and obscene. ' 25 The Supreme Court of Illinois upheld the censor
19 Ibid., at 317, 313.
2 0Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Bd. of Regents, 305 N.Y. 336, 339, 113 N.E.2d 502
(1953).
21 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952).
22 Holmby Productions v. Vaughn, 177 Kan. 728, 729, 282 P.2d 412, 413 (1955).
23 350 U.S. 870 (1955).
24 Municipal Code of Chicago, c. 155-4, provides: "Such permit shall be granted only
after the motion picture film for which said permit is requested has been produced at
the office of the commissioner of police for examination or censorship. If a picture or
series of pictures, for the showing or exhibition of which an application for a permit is
made, is immoral or obscene, or portrays depravity, criminality, or lack of virtue of a
class of citizens of any race, color, creed, or religion and exposes them to contempt,
derision, or obloquy, or tends to produce a breach of the peace or riots, or purports to
represent any hanging, lynching, or burning of a human being, it shall be the duty of
the commissioner of police to refuse such permit; otherwise it shall be his duty to grant
such permit."
25 American Civil Liberties Union v. Chicago, 3 lll.2d 334, 336, 121 N.E.2d 585, 587
(1954).
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board, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld the Illinois Supreme Court because of its favorable reaction to the
interpretation of the Chicago Ordinance by that court.26
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Court of Appeals
in Times Film Corp. v. Chicago,27 again in a memorandum decision,
this time founded on Alberts v. California.28 The Alberts decision set down
a judicially approved standard of "obscenity" declaring: "Whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the domi-
nant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests."2 9
Since the Court based its opinion on the Alberts case which decided
that obscenity was not included within the protection of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, the Court was probably indicating that the film
was truly not obscene, at least, not obscene as the Court defines obscenity.
Regarding proper standards, a further observation may be drawn, namely
that the Chicago Ordinance, as interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court
is acceptable, in as much as it was before the Court, which did not choose
to rule unfavorably, or to be more exact and less charitable, it did not
rule on it at all.
SUPPRESSION OF IDEAS: A NEW ASPECT
The Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, in
1959, denied a license for the exhibition of the picture "Lady Chatterley's
Lover" on the ground that the whole theme of this motion picture is the
presentation of adultery as a "desirable, acceptable and proper pattern of
behavior."30 The New York Court of Appeals in upholding the Board of
Regents said, the New York legislature, "requires the denial of a license
to any motion picture which portrays acts of sexual immorality [here
adultery] as proper behavior." 3' The court, however, apparently felt
that it made no difference as to the manner of portrayal, that is, whether
the portrayal was obscene. It shifted from obscenity to sociology and
asked: "What can society do about protecting itself from motion pictures
which are corruptive of the public morals?" 82 The question was answered
by holding that a motion picture can be denied a license because it por-
trays adultery as proper behavior.
26 Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 244 F.2d 432 (C.A. 7th, 1957).
27 355 U.S. 35 (1957).
28 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
29 Ibid., at 489.
SO New York Education Law (McKinney, 1953) c. 16, §§ 122, 122-a. (Supp., 1959).
81 Kingsley v. Regents, 4 N.Y.2d 349, 355, 151 N.E.2d 197, 200 (1958) (emphasis
supplied).
82 Ibid., at 358, 201.
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In refuting the notion that motion pictures can be censored without
regard to obscenity, the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Kingsley Int. Pictures v. Regents of the University of N.Y.,3 8 said:
What New York has done, therefore, is to prevent the exhibition of a mo-
tion picture because that picture advocates an idea-that adultery under certain
circumstances may be proper behavior. Yet, the First Amendment's basic guar-
antee is of freedom to advocate ideas.3 4
Implicit in New York's sociological argument was the Court of Appeals'
feeling that "proper adultery" was contrary to the moral standards, the
religious precepts, and the legal code of its citizenry. In answer, the
Supreme Court stated:
Its [the Constitution's] guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas
that are conventional or shared by a majority. It protects advocacy of the
opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of so-
cialism or the single tax. And in the realm of ideas it protects expression which
is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.3 5
The Court concluded by saying that: "Advocacy of conduct proscribed
by law is not . . a justification for denying free speech where the ad-
vocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the
advocacy would be immediately acted on."3 6 It is interesting to note here
the curious blending of two different areas of law, subversion, and censor-
ship. The blending is compelling no less than it is curious, because here,
as in the prosecution of subversive cases under state and federal legislation,
it is observed that a mere idea, with nothing more, no matter how dreadful,
can never be suppressed unless there is an incitement to some activity
which will bring the idea to a stage wherein it will be susceptible to sanc-
tions imposed by law and within constitutional limitations. Further, both
deal with the First Amendment which is generally conceded to be the
bulwark of a democracy 7
It becomes apparent from a review of the cases that the censorship
83 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
84 lbid, at 688 (emphasis supplied).
85 Ibid., at 689.
86 Ibid., at 689.
37 "[Aldvocacy... is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy
falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate the the advocacy would be
immediately acted on." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1926) (concurring
opinion). "lit is not the abstract doctrine ... which is denounced ... but the teaching
and advocacy [thereof] by language ordinarily calculated to incite persons to such
action." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 511 (1950). "[It was not necessary ...
that the trial court should have employed the particular term 'incite,' it was nevertheless
incumbent on the court to make clear in some fashion that the advocacy must be of
action and not merely some abstract doctrine." Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,
325 (1956).
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policies of the several states have been rejected for three separate reasons:
One, vagueness of the censorship statutes; two, the movie was not obscene
as obscenity is defined by the Court; and three, ideas not portrayed in
a manner likely to incite to action are not subject to censorship.
CONCLUSION
Where does this leave the censor? It is evident that no matter how
definite the criteria, an abstract idea without some act can never be
censored.
However, the problem of proper criteria must still be solved and a
standard, illusive though it may seem, must be searched for. The Supreme
Court of Illinois interpretation of the Chicago Censorship Ordinance may
be acceptable:
A motion picture is obscene within the meaning of the ordinance if, when
considered as a whole, its calculated purpose or dominant effect is substantially
to arouse sexual desires, and if the probability of this effect is so great as to
outweigh whatever artistic or other merits the film may possess. In making this
determination the films must be tested with reference to its effect upon the
normal, average person.38
From a perusal of the above citation one is able to see that the Court
is interested only with obscene movies, and not with the suppression of
socially unacceptable ideas; there are no sociological overtones. Added to
the foregoing is the further fact that the above criteria already seems to
have Supreme Court approval since when it was before the Court in
Times Film v. Chicago"0 it was not struck down, the case being resolved
on the factual question of whether or not the movie was obscene.
Another possibility is the skeletal proposal of Mr. Justice Clark in his
concurring opinion in the Kingsley case: "I see no grounds for confusion,
however, were a statute to ban 'pornographic films,' or those that portray
acts of sexual immorality, perversion or lewdness."
'40
Justice Clark goes on to say that "if New York's statute had been so
construed by its highest court I believe it would have met the require-
ments of due process. Instead, it placed more emphasis on what the film
teaches than on what it depicts. There is where the confusion enters."
4 1
Now that we have some guide to a proper standard, and seemingly the
only standards which will bear up under the Court's judicial scrutiny,
the question arises: "Just what type of movies can be banned?" It is sub-
38 American Civil Liberties Union v. Chicago, 3 Ill.2d 334, 347, 121 N.E.2d 585, 592
(1954).
39 355 U.S. 35 (1957).
40 360 U.S. 684, 702 (1959) (emphasis supplied).
41 Ibid., at 702.
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mitted that the only type of movie that can be banned is one which
displays obscene or pornographic acts; nothing else and nothing less will
be censorable. 42 Innuendo, double meanings, suggestiveness, sex, ideas and
nudity of and by themselves, without obscene acts, will not be susceptible
of censorship.
42 
"We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech
or press." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
SOME ASPECTS OF PLEADING UNDER
THE JONES ACT
In the thirty-nine years since the passage of the Jones Act, a substantial
amount of litigation has taken place over the problem of the meaning of
the Act and its terms. Much of this litigation has involved determination
of problems of pleading under the Act. It is the purpose of the writer,
by an examination of these cases, to acquaint the reader with the more
important aspects of pleading a case under the Jones Act today.
ORIGIN OF THE ACT
The present Jones Act was enacted in 1920 as an amended form of the
1915 Merchant Marine Act' known as the LaFollette Act which provided:
In any suit to recover damages for any injury sustained on board vessel or in
its service seaman having command shall not be held to be fellow-servants with
those under their authority.2
Prior to the 1915 Act, seamen were not entitled to compensatory damages
for negligent navigation or management of the ship or crew resulting in
injuries to them.3 Judging by the fact that Congress, with the enactment
of the 1915 Act, had expressly disallowed the fellow servant doctrine as
a defense to an action by a seaman for injuries due to negligence, it would
seem that Congress had interpreted some prior decisons4 as holding that
the fellow servant doctrine was the bar to any such action and accordingly
obviated that defense. Subsequent to the passage of the 1915 Act, how-
ever, it was held that the Act did not affect the rule that the negligent
order of an officer or even of the master does not charge the shipowner
I Merchant Marine Act, 1915, 38 Stat. 1164 (1915), as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. S 688
(Supp., 1958).
2 38 Star. 1185 (1915).
3 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
4 The Supreme Court held the law to be settled: "That all the members of the crew,
except perhaps the master, are, as between themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen
cannot recover for injuries sustained through the negligence of another member of the
crew.. .. " The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
